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ABSTRACT
The United States has ratified various treaties impinging on traditional areas of state
concern. Recently, in a nod to federalism, the federal government has adopted practices excusing
the states from complying with some of these treaties. These practices have put the United States
in violation of treaty obligations and are in tension with principles of international law.
While there is extensive scholarship recommending changes to U.S. law that would
potentially balance state interests and treaty obligations, almost none of it considers working
solutions found in other federally organized nations. Recent reforms in Australia allow its states
to consult with the Commonwealth government before treaties affecting state interests are
ratified. This Article argues that adopting aspects of the Australian reforms in the United States
would alleviate the current U.S. tension with international law by giving states a role in treaty
making that does not prevent the federal government from meeting treaty obligations.
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C. Effect of Australian Reforms on Potential Federalism Limits to the Treaty Power
D. Practicality of Applying Australian Reforms in the United States
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Throughout U.S. history, the interests of the states1 have often conflicted with treaty
obligations.2 Traditionally, however, U.S. law has been a strict parent and suppressed this
conflict by asserting that, as far as treaties are concerned, states should neither be seen nor
heard.3 Adopting a more progressive parenting technique, the U.S. federal government, in a nod
to the principles of federalism, has recently allowed the states to make their presence felt in the
realm of treaty compliance in two ways. First, the executive branch and the Senate have attached
statements to treaties indicating that the federal government will implement its obligations under
the treaties only as far as its federal system allows and that additional implementation will be left
to the states.4 These statements are known as federalism reservations.5 Second, the federal

1

In order to avoid confusion and based on the model provided by Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain
the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 404 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter Swaine, Does Federalism], I use the terms
“states,” “territories,” and “sub-units” to refer to subnational governments and “nations,” “countries,”
“Commonwealth government” and “federal government” to refer to nation-states or national governments.
2
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000) (outlining the reoccurrence of the debate throughout American
history) [hereinafter Golove, Treaty-Making].
3
See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2004) (presenting but not agreeing with the proposition and citing, e.g., Zchernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)); Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 1
(presenting but not agreeing with the proposition); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining
and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1129 n.1 (2000) [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federalism]
(citing for the proposition, but not agreeing with, e.g. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]). For a discussion of the numerous ways
states have historically exerted and continue to exert some control over compliance with treaties, see Ku, supra, at
476-526.
4
See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text; see also Ku, supra note 3, at 521-26.
5
See, e.g., Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 2, at 1273 (using the term “federalism reservations”). These
reservations are also called federalism understandings, Ku, supra note 3, at 522 (using the term “federalism
understanding” and distinguishing it from “federal reservation”), and federalism RUDs (an acronym for
reservations, understandings, and declarations), Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 442 (using the term
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government allowed the states to heavily influence the enforcement of certain International Court
of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) orders stemming from treaty violations.6 Like the best efforts of many
well-meaning parents, these more tolerant practices have failed to resolve the underlying conflict
and have created fresh problems. They only marginally protect the principles of federalism and
turn out to be in serious tension with international law.
The U.S. practice of unilaterally attaching federalism reservations to multilateral treaties
has historic roots7 but has been used most significantly in three human rights treaties ratified
within the last twenty years.8 The U.S. executive branch and Senate attached reservations to
these treaties because of concerns that treaty obligations might interfere with areas of traditional
state concern.9 These reservations have two important components. First, they declare the
attached treaties to be non-self executing,10 meaning that they must be implemented before going

“federalism RUDs”). In this Article, I use the term “federalism reservation” to indicate any treaty reservation
directly aimed at making accommodations for federal systems of government.
6
See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text; see also Ku, supra note 3, at 510-21.
7
Although unilateral reservations to multilateral treaties were not embraced by international law until the 1950s, see
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399,
431 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent], the United States had a history of negotiating
for federalism reservations in bilateral treaties, id. at 409-10, and a constitutional amendment requiring the use of
federalism reservations came relatively close to being passed in the 1950s. Id. at 412-13.
8
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984 (ratified in 1994), 23 I.L.M. 1027, revised 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified in 1988) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified in 1994). Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith cite these treaties and ratification dates in
the context of demonstrating the U.S. practice of using reservations to treaties generally and for federalism purposes,
Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 416.
9
See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 416.
10
See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 ¶ III (daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter Race Convention
reservations]; U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 ¶ III(1) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR reservations]; U.S.
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17492 ¶ III(1) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
[hereinafter Torture Convention reservations]; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at
416 n.87 (citing these reservations generally and providing directions to the University of Minnesota’s excellent web
site which provides their text, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html).
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into effect.11 Second, they proclaim that the treaties “shall be implemented by the federal
government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local governments.”12 These reservations bring states into the treaty
process by, on their face, allowing states to choose whether to implement any of the treaty
provisions that affect areas of state concern.13 State interests, however, are only partially served
by this practice because the federal government can, on a whim, decide not to attach any
reservations to a treaty.14 This is not the only drawback to the reservations. By giving the choice
of implementing certain treaty obligations to the states, the U.S. federal government seems to
have waived responsibility for those obligations. Because of this apparent waiver, the federalism
reservations potentially violate international law.15 Furthermore, they are generally disfavored in

11

Ku, supra note 3, at 462. The default rule in the United States is that treaties are self-executing, meaning they
come into legal force as soon as they are ratified. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987) (explaining that courts must give direct effect to international law and that treaties
are only “non-self executing” under special conditions). Although “self-executing” treaties are legally binding and
can be upheld in court, some form of active implementation may still be required in order to meet the specific
obligations of the treaty. See Ku, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing state implementation of self-executing treaties);
see infra at note 97 and accompanying text.
12
Race Convention reservations, supra note 10, ¶ II; see also ICCPR reservations, supra note 10, ¶ II(5); Torture
Convention reservations, supra note 10, ¶ II(5).
13
See Ku, supra note 3, at 525 (stating that non-self-execution clauses preclude judicial enforcement and that states
are likely left with jurisdiction over the treaty with which the federal government cannot interfere). Whether the
federalism reservations succeed in leaving the choice to implement treaties to the states is, as a legal matter, hotly
debated. While Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have defended the legal validity of the reservations, Conditional
Consent, supra note 7, at 401-02, others contend that they serve no legal purpose because the U.S. federal
government has jurisdiction over all matters arising under a treaty. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346 (1995) [hereinafter, Henkin,
Ghost].
14
See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16 (explaining that the executive branch and
the Senate have the choice whether to attach federalism reservations to treaties).
15
For example, according to Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni:
“Good faith” is a basic requirement in the law of treaties, and a “reservation” or the like which
expressly holds that the treaty at issue does not impose any duty on the United States to enact
implementing legislation that may be contrary to the Constitution as interpreted by domestic law and
judicial interpretations violates that basic principle. For all practical purposes, this “reservation”
leaves the United States free from any legal obligation under the ICCPR whenever, in its sole
discretion, it decides not to implement it legislatively. In fact, this “reservation” allows Congress, at
any time, to pass a law contrary to an ICCPR provision and have it supersede the treaty. Also, it
allows any federal judge to hold that a given statute or court decision supersedes the ICCPR.
This open-ended approach to treaties is incompatible with international law, much as it is
incompatible with common sense and good judgment.
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treaty talks because negotiating nations view them as illegitimate attempts by federal nations to
reduce their obligations under the proposed treaties.16
The conflict between state interests and treaty obligations has been particularly bitter in
reference to a series of binding ICJ orders based on U.S. violations of treaty obligations under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter VCCR).17 The ICJ orders have
required the stay of executions18 and the review of convictions and sentencing of certain foreign
nationals in the United States.19 In regards to the orders staying executions, the U.S. federal
government under President William Jefferson Clinton pursued a course of action sensitive to
federalism concerns. The government argued that it could not interfere with state criminal

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by
the United States, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1179-80 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Henkin, Ghost, supra note
13, at 344. Contra Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 423-39 (evaluating Bassiouni’s and
Henkin’s arguments and concluding that, despite various concerns, unilateral reservations to treaties do not violate
international law).
16
Attachment C - Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties ¶ 8.1, Council of
Australian Governments’ Communiqué 14 June 1996 [hereinafter Principles and Procedures],
http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/140696/attachment_c.htm; Brian R. Opeskin, International Law and Federal
States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM 1, 15-17 (1997) (describing general resistance to federalism
reservations and specifically to those proposed by the United States and Australia for the ICCPR) [hereinafter
Opeskin, Federal States]. But see Opeskin, Federal States, supra, at 19 (citing Gillian Triggs, Australia’s
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?, 31 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 278, 292 (1982), for the proposition that in some cases non-federal states may agree to federalism
reservations in order to encourage wider accession to a treaty).
17
Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Mar. 31, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 581 (2004) [hereinafter Avena
Final Order], available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Provisional
Measures Order of Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Avena Provisional Measures Order], http://www.icj-cij.org; LaGrand
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures Order of Mar. 3) [hereinafter LaGrand Provisional Measures
Order], available at http://www.icj-cij.org; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Provisional
Measures Order), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (April 9) [hereinafter VCCR Provisional Measures Order], available at
http://www.icj-cij.org. ICJ final orders are binding under the terms of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38(1), 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060; 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER_II, to which the United States and all
signatories of the UN Charter are parties, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 266 n.78 (2d ed.
1996). See also, e.g., Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in the
United States: Breard v. Green, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 40 (1999) (stating that ICJ rulings are
binding on states). The status of the provisional measures issued in some of the VCCR disputes was uncertain until
more recently, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (June 27, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1096 ¶ 109 (2001) [hereinafter LaGrand
Final Order] (ICJ ruling that provisional measures are binding), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
18
Avena Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, ¶ 59; LaGrand Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, at
16 ¶ 29; VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, at 258 ¶ 41.
19
Avena Final Order, supra note 17, at 619 ¶¶ 138-41 (ordering review and reconsideration beyond what is
available in the clemency process).
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proceedings20 and limited its enforcement of the orders to functionally non-binding
communiqués and letters requesting state compliance.21 State response to these requests was
mixed,22 and executions in Virginia and Arizona put the United States in violation of
international law.23
President George W. Bush’s response to the ICJ’s review orders has been no more
satisfying. Although Bush insisted the VCCR did not apply to Texas when he was Governor24

20

In the federal government’s Amicus Curiae Brief to Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), a U.S. Supreme
Court case arising out of the same facts as the ICJ VCCR case, “[t]he Solicitor General stated . . . to the Supreme
Court that the ‘federal system imposes limits on the federal government’s ability to interfere with the criminal
justice systems of the States. The measures at the United States’ disposal under our Constitution may in some cases
include only persuasion . . . .’” Ku, supra note 3, at 513, (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51,
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214 (A97-732) (internal quotations omitted)).
21
In response to the VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote
Virginia Governor James Gilmore requesting that he abide by the ICJ order and stay the execution of Angel
Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national. Ku, supra note 3, at 512 & n.278. In response to the LaGrand Provisional
Measures Order, supra note 17, the ICJ order was merely forwarded to the Governor of Arizona. See LaGrand Case,
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, ¶ 4.169 (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Sept. 16, 1999) (cited by Ku, supra note 3,
at 512 n.278), http://www.icj-cij.org. The response to the recent ICJ decision in Avena and other Mexican Nationals,
supra note 17, requiring review and reconsideration of the cases of Mexican nationals who were denied their
consular notification rights, has been similar. In anticipation of the pending Oklahoma execution of Mexican
national Osbaldo Torres Aguilera, U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV wrote Oklahoma
Governor Brad Henry and the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board requesting that they give “careful consideration”
to Torres’ clemency request. Sean D. Murphy, Implementation of the Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 581, 582 & nn.7 & 9 (2004) (citing and providing key passages from the letters).
22
After receiving letters from U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV, see supra note 21,
Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry commuted the sentence of a Mexican national from death to life in prison. Murphy,
supra note 21, at 582. In response to the VCCR Provisional Measures Order, supra note 17, however, the Governor
of Virginia denied the Secretary of State’s request for a stay, see supra note 21, and executed Breard as planned. See
Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666, 674 (reprinting
Governor Gilmore’s statement outlining why he did not grant Breard clemency). Similarly, in the LaGrand case,
Arizona went ahead with its execution of German national Walter LaGrand. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (June 27,
2001), 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1079 ¶ 34 (2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
23
LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at 1102 ¶ 5 (ICJ ruling that U.S. failure to take all measures at its disposal to
stay Arizona execution of LaGrand was a breach of U.S. obligations). Paraguay withdrew its case against the U.S.
once Virginia executed Breard, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426
(Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10), available at http:// www.icj-cij.org, but the facts indicate a similar result to that
in LaGrand had the case gone forward. To be fair, there was some question as to whether ICJ provisional measures
were binding under international law when the executions took place, LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at 1092 ¶
99.
24
See, e.g., Al Kamen, Virtually Blushing, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997 at A17 (quoting general counsel Alberto R.
Gonzalez as saying “[s]ince the State of Texas is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, . .
. we believe it is inappropriate to ask Texas to determine whether a breach of [the treaty] occurred in connection
with the arrest and conviction of Mr. Montoya.”) (cited by Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human
Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 588 (1997), for the proposition that sub-national governments fail to consider
international law in decisionmaking).
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and has made strong comments in favor of federalism,25 his administration has announced plans
to force state courts to review the sentencing of foreign nationals as required by the ICJ.26 This
action, however, does not mean that the Bush administration is more concerned with
international law and order than federalism. At about the same time as plans regarding the review
orders were made public, the federal government announced its withdrawal from the provisions
of the VCCR that allow disputes arising under it to be heard by the ICJ.27 Considering that, in
order to resolve the Iran hostage crisis, the United States was the first country to appeal to the
ICJ under its VCCR jurisdiction,28 this is a substantial sacrifice presumably made on behalf of
the states in order to insulate them from future ICJ rulings. The courts continue to address
whether ICJ review orders are enforceable,29 and the states are likely to challenge any orders
requiring court review of sentencing.30 The ongoing conflict is disturbing evidence that the

25

E.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National Governors’ Association Meeting (Feb. 26,
2001) (“I’m going to make respect for federalism a priority in this administration. Respect for federalism begins
with an understanding of its philosophy. The framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-knowing, allpowerful federal government. They believed that our freedom is best preserved when power is dispersed. That is
why they limited and enumerated the federal government’s powers, and reserved the remaining functions of
government to the states.”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010226-8.html.
26
Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16,
available at 2005 WLNR 3685583; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Medellin v. Dretke, No.
No. 04-5928 (S. Ct. argued Mar. 28, 2005) (“[I]n the exercise of his constitutionally based foreign affairs power, and
his authority under the United Nations Charter, the President has determined that compliance should be achieved by
the enforcement of the ICJ decision in state courts in accordance with principles of comity. That presidential
determination, like an executive agreement, has independent legal force and effect, and contrary state rules must
give way under the Supremacy Clause.”), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/045928/04-5928.mer.ami.usa.html.
27
Liptak, supra note 26, at A16; see United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Announcement:
All Consular Notification Requirements Remain in Effect, http://travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html.
28
See Supreme Court to Hear Case of Mexican National on Death Row in Connection With Alleged US Treaty
Violations (National Public Radio Morning Edition radio broadcast, Mar. 28, 2005) (citing Ambassador Thomas
Pickering for the proposition that ICJ helped pave the way for the freeing of the hostages) [hereinafter Supreme
Court to Hear]; see generally Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran)
(Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 15, 1979), 1979 I.C.J. 7, available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
29
The Supreme Court is, at the time this article is being written, considering whether to allow a Mexican Texas
death row inmate to challenge his conviction based on the ICJ’s order. Medellin v. Dretke, No. No. 04-5928 (S. Ct.
argued Mar. 28, 2005). The Court previously struck down similar pleas, stating that inmates were procedurally
barred from bringing claims under the VCCR at any time after trial. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1998).
30
Supreme Court to Hear, supra note 28 (quoting the Texas Attorney General as saying, “[w]e respectfully believe
the executive determination exceeds the constitutional bounds for federal authority.”); see Liptak, supra note 26, at
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federal government has yet to find a satisfactory method of reconciling state interests and treaty
obligations.
To unsettle matters even more, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a bevy of recent
opinions that signal potential constitutional limits on the federal government’s ability to impose
treaty obligations on the states.31 These limits would likely make it extremely difficult for the
United States to comply with international obligations.32 Since there are rarely concrete
ramifications for treaty violations,33 the United States would not suffer overmuch by placing
federalism ahead of treaty obligations. The federal government, however, has expressed
commitment to its international obligations generally and the VCCR in particular.34 Issues of

A16 (citing a spokesman for the Texas Attorney General, and concluding that “Texas prosecutors have not conceded
that the president has the power to force state courts to reopen the Medellin case.”).
31
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415-41 (citing the Supreme Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence,
embodied in such cases as United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999),
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), City of Boerne v. Flores, 421 U.S. 507 (1997), Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992), as potentially limiting the federal government’s treaty power).
32
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 408 (stating that, “[s]hould any of this come to pass [referring to the
application of the Supreme Court’s federalism rulings to the treaty power], the new federalism will have placed the
United States in violation of its treaty obligations”).
33
See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 196
(1998) (stating that “[o]f course, international law generally is not . . . subject to supranational enforcement
mechanisms, and as a practical matter is . . . subject to violation on a regular basis,” but listing other consequences);
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 713 (“Treaty
obligations might be thought by some to be ‘precatory’ as a general matter because effective international
enforcement mechanisms are lacking.”) [hereinafter Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties].
34
In regards international law generally, consider statements from the George W. Bush administration regarding the
treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. E.g., Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, Press
Briefing (June 22, 2004) (“President Bush knows his most important job is to protect this nation. At the same time,
he’s made it clear, in the war against al Qaeda and its supporters, the United States will follow its treaty obligations
and U.S. law, both of which prohibit the use of torture. And this has been firm U.S. policy since the outset of this
administration and it remains our policy today.”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004062214.html; Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, Press Gaggle (May 17, 2004) (“But our policy is clear. The
United States policy is that we comply with all our laws and with our -- and with our treaty obligations. And that is
our policy.”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040517-7.html; Colin L. Powell, U.S. Secretary
of State, Interview on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos (June 13, 2004) (“He was -- the President
believed, and he has said this, that he would follow all obligations, because he felt he was bound by those
obligations. . . . And his instructions to us consistently were to follow our obligations under international treaties and
other constraints that applied to our activities.”), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/33474.htm. In regards the
VCCR, see Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of
Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998) (reprinted in Charney & Reisman, supra note 22, at 671-72) (stating that “[t]he execution
of Mr. Breard in the present circumstance could lead some countries to contend incorrectly that the U.S. does not
take seriously its obligations under the [VCCR]”) [hereinafter Albright Letter].
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reciprocity and the maintenance of good bargaining relations are enough to justify this
commitment,35 and, in the best of all worlds, the United States would develop a treaty-making
and compliance process that encompasses its federal system of government without sacrificing
international law.36
The observation that federal systems of government and compliance with international
law do not always go hand-in-hand is not new,37 and it is no surprise that other federal nations
have faced problems balancing state interests and international obligations.38 Over the last thirty
years, one federally organized nation in particular, Australia, which is composed of six states and
two territories,39 has adopted procedural reforms designed to address this issue by developing a
role for states in its treaty-making process in a manner that does not undermine compliance with

35

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 51-54 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter HENKIN,
HOW NATIONS] (discussing the foreign policy reasons nations have for complying with international law); see also
Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and its Effect on Reciprocity
for United States Citizens Abroad, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (indicating concern about U.S. citizens’
consular notification rights abroad because of failure of United States to meet VCCR obligations); Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 408-10 (citing HENKIN, HOW NATIONS, supra, and discussing the negative bargaining
effects for the United States if it appears unable to enforce international law against the states); Albright Letter,
supra note 34, at 672 (same as Heath, supra).
36
For the purposes of this Article, references to treaty making refer to the steps in the treaty process before
ratification.
37
See Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1995) (quoting K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 186 (4th ed. 1963) and New South Wales v.
Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 445 (Stephen, J.)) [hereinafter Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties].
38
For example, local state opposition has hindered India’s implementation of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species, the Agreement on the International Trade of Tropical Timber, and the World Heritage
Convention. Ronald J. Herring & Erach Barusha, Embedded Capacities: India’s Compliance with International
Environmental Accords, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 395, 396-97 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobsen eds., 1998). Similarly,
Canada’s federal system has prevented total implementation of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, with only three provinces enforcing the treaty’s side agreement. Joseph DiMento, International
Environmental Law: A Global Assessment, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,387, 10,421 n.321 (2003) (examining the record as
of June 2002).
39
For simplicity, I generally refer to both the states and territories as “states” in this article. The six states are New
South Wales, Tasmania, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia. The two internal territories
are the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. Australia also has a number of external territories,
but the internal territories have self-governing status like the states, and, despite some constitutional differences, are
for most purposes essentially the same as the states. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 1 n.4.
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treaty obligations.40 In a nutshell, Australia has reconciled its central authority with the
autonomy of its states by adopting procedures that give the territories an official but non-binding
advisory role in the treaty-making process.41 This caters to federalism by giving states a platform
for voicing misgivings about treaties that infringe on their traditional areas of concern. With this
platform, states can put political pressure on the federal government to either modify those
treaties or not ratify them at all.42 This arrangement, however, does not alter the federal
government’s supremacy in foreign affairs, and it retains power over the states to uphold
international law and any treaties that have been adopted.43
The goal of this Article is to examine Australian reforms and evaluate whether they
represent a viable option in the U.S. legal and political environment for reconciling federalism
and the international law of treaties.44 While there is a mountain of scholarship examining the
appropriate role of federalism in U.S. treaty relations and proposing methods of incorporating

40

Australia’s Commonwealth government has had a commitment to territory involvement in the early stages of the
treaty-making process since 1977, see Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 14, and initially
adopted formal procedures for accomplishing it in 1983, see Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional References
Committee, Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties ¶ 13.19 (1995) [hereinafter
Trick or Treaty?], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/reports/tortcon.html, with the most recent revision coming
in 1996. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16; see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the
International Legal Order, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 423, 439-40 (2003).
41
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 5.
42
See Treaty Making – The People’s Process, Joint Committee on Treaties, Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane,
July 20, 2000, at 7 (statement of Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs) (explaining that under the
reforms, the federal government “would obviously try to get a consensus amongst the states and the territories
before ratifying a treaty which is of relevance to them.”) [hereinafter The People’s Process],
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/j1026.pdf.
43
See Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and Legislative Power, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM
104, 124 (1997) (“through the High Court’s expansive interpretation of Commonwealth powers it has been possible
for the Government to initiate and for Parliament to enact legislation designed to give effect to international law.
This legislative capacity has been an important element in ensuring that Australia has been able to play an active and
responsible role in international affairs.”); see also Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12
(“The upshot of the High Court’s interpretation of federal legislative power over external affairs is that Parliament
does not lack power to implement treaties to which Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever their subject
matter.”).
44
It should be noted that the scope of this article is limited to treaties and does not attempt to include an analysis of
international agreements made by sole executive agreement or congressional-executive agreement. For a discussion
of these types of agreements and federalism issues raised by them, see David Sloss, International Agreements and
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN L. REV. 1963 (2003).
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it,45 almost none of it has looked to solutions in other federally organized nations.46 Even though
comparative federalism has been dismissed as an impossible mixing of apples and oranges,47 it
“may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem--in this case the problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve
the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity.”48 The Australian
reforms giving states an advisory role are of particular interest for the United States because they
echo the Framers’ original intent of requiring state advice and consent in treaty making.49

45

See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998)
[hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power Part I]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II,
99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100-01 (2000) (proposing that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), should be
overturned and that Congress’s power to implement treaties should be limited by the federalism considerations that
have limited its power in other arenas) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power Part II]; Ku, supra note 3, at 532-33
(finding that U.S. states already play an important role in implementing international law and that their continued
involvement potentially brings greater political legitimacy for, and U.S. involvement in, international law);
Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the
United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 288-89 (2001) (encouraging inter-governmental cooperation between the
states and federal government in implementing international human rights treaties); Swaine, Does Federalism, supra
note 1, at 499-532 (“reviving” compacts between U.S. states and foreign nations as a method of incorporating states
into foreign affairs). For exhaustive historical support for the view that states have no formal place in foreign affairs,
see Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 2, at 1079-81.
46
A notable exception is provided by Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National
Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1053-57 (2001) [hereinafter Halberstam,
Foreign Affairs] (weighing the benefits for the United States of EU/German style state participation in foreign
affairs).
47
In Printz v. New York, Justice Scalia deemed “such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one . . . . The fact is that our federalism is
not Europe’s.” Printz v. New York, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (as quoted by Neil Colman McCabe, “Our
Federalism,” Not Theirs: Judicial Comparative Federalism in the U.S., 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 541, 543 (1999)).
Professor Swaine makes a different but related point in examining the various approaches federal nations take
toward interpreting their constitutions in reference to international law, stating that it is “hazardous to generalize
about federal systems at all.” Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 463-66.
48
Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing EU/German and U.S. approaches to the
implementation of federal laws at the constituent government level).
49
The Constitution requires the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate in treaty making, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
and, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators were appointed by state legislatures and were regarded
as representing state interests in the treaty process. Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The
Treaty Power at the Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 231-32
(2001). As part of “Advice and Consent,” many Framers imagined the Senate taking an active advisory role in treaty
negotiations, although this practice was dismissed almost immediately in favor of consent alone. Bradley &
Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 405-06; see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the historically analogous roles for U.S. and Australian states in federal treaty
making provide additional impetus to examine the applicability of the Australian reforms.50
In undertaking this examination, I analyze, in Part I, the historical role of U.S. states in
treaty making and the potential legal changes that might alter that role. In this section, I also
briefly consider and critique some of the current academic proposals for incorporating federalism
in U.S. foreign affairs. In Part II, I compare federalism in pre-reform Australian foreign affairs to
the historical situation in the United States. I continue by describing the recent procedural
changes and examining the results of those reforms. In Part III, I analyze the appropriateness of
the Australian reforms for the United States by examining the practical and legal consequences
of adopting the reforms. Finally, I conclude that although wholesale U.S. adoption of the
Australian reforms would be impractical because of the far greater number of U.S. states,
incorporating some of the reforms would be an attractive method for including federalism in U.S.
foreign affairs.
I. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE U.S. TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
The Framers addressed the question of the appropriate role of states in the treaty process
when they adopted the U.S. Constitution.51 Because state interference in foreign affairs had
nearly driven the country to war under the Articles of Confederation,52 the Framers designed the

50

Before reform, Australian states were in the same situation as U.S. states after the Seventeenth Amendment, see
supra note 49 and infra Part I, and had no formal role (advisory or otherwise) in the treaty-making decisions of the
executive branch. See Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.19 (describing introduction in 1977 of guidelines for
giving states a role in treaty making). This is in contrast to German and EU systems, where constituent governments
are formally represented in the treaty process. See The Law Library of Congress, Directorate of Legal Research,
National Treaty Powers and Implementation 32, 49 (LL File No. 2004-825); see also Daniel Halberstam,
Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 235-36 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse
eds. 2001) (explaining role of Member States and Länder generally in law making processes) [hereinafter
Halberstam, Comparative Federalism]. I do not meant to overstate the similarity between U.S. and Australian
systems; important distinctions remain. See infra Part II (comparing the two systems in greater depth).
51
See, e.g., Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 2, at 1102.
52
Id. at 1115-16 (discussing tensions created by state refusal to comply with stipulations of the 1782 Treaty of Peace
with Great Britain).
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Constitution to give the federal government supremacy in all treaty matters.53 In order to
accomplish this, the Constitution generally excises the states from foreign affairs.54 The Framers,
however, attempted to create balance by giving states an advice-and-consent role in the treaty
process. Contrary to their intentions, states no longer, as a rule, participate in treaty making.
Under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, the Framers gave the treaty-making power to the
President “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.” At the founding, Senators were appointed by state legislatures and
thus, at least in the Framers’ conception, represented state interests when considering treaties.55
The Framers’ intent was that Senators would actively advise the President during treaty
negotiations and possess the power to reject a treaty by refusing consent.56 The Framers’
intentions, however, were stymied almost immediately when the George Washington
administration abandoned the practice of seeking Senate advice during treaty negotiations.57

53

Id. at 1103-04, 1132.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); see U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (“[The President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . .”). Article X, Section 10, Clause 3 leaves the door open for states to form “compacts”
with foreign nations, but only with Congress’s consent. For more on state-foreign compacts, see infra notes 111-14
and accompanying text.
55
Anderson, supra note 49, at 231-32. (citing James Madison among others).
56
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Bradley, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 405 (citing RALSTON HAYDEN, THE
SENATE AND TREATIES 1789-1817 (1920), among others, for the proposition that “[m]any of the Founders believed
that the advice function required that the President consult with the Senate prior to negotiating and signing a
treaty”). Ralston Hayden reports that active consultation during treaty negotiation was the original intent of the
Washington administration and Senate. HAYDEN, supra at 103-04.
57
HAYDEN, supra note 56, at 104 (“In the end it became [Washington’s] custom merely to inform the Senate of the
proposed negotiation upon securing its consent to the nomination of the agent, and to submit the latter’s instructions
only with the completed treaty.”); see also Bradley, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 405-06 (citing Hayden).
Professor Bradley argues that the Senate adopted conditional consent in order to fulfill its advisory role. Bradley,
Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 406. Regardless, state “advice” in the form of conditional consent was, like
state “consent,” superceded by the Seventeenth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
54
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State ability to consent to or reject treaties through representation in the Senate fared
better, lasting until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.58 The Seventeenth
Amendment requires the popular election of Senators and thus eliminated the Senate’s traditional
role as protecting the concerns of state institutions.59 Because Senators are elected at the state
level they continue to be somewhat guided by state concerns, but they have no incentive to
protect the states from federal action. As Professor Larry D. Kramer explains:
[I]f we assume that members of Congress elected on the basis of geography
respond to state and local interests, doesn’t this, in turn, give them an incentive to
reduce or minimize the role of state and local government? Federal politicians
will want to earn the support and affection of local constituents by providing
desired services themselves--through the federal government--rather than to give
or share credit with state officials. State officials are rivals, not allies, a fact the
Framers understood and the reason they made Senators directly beholden to state
legislators in the first place.60
Thus, even though the Seventeenth Amendment does not entirely erase state concerns from
consideration in the Senate, it in “no way means that federal lawmakers will choose not to
preempt state law or not to displace the political authority of state institutions.”61

58

Anderson, supra note 49, at 231-32; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 224 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting Politics] (stating that the
Seventeenth Amendment eliminated “the one feature of the Senate that really might have protected states, the power
of state legislators to choose Senators”). Professor Kramer argues that Senate concern with federalism issues
probably dried up even before the Seventeenth Amendment because Senators’ long terms insulated them from
effective review by state legislatures. Kramer, Putting Politics, supra at 224 n.33. Professor Golove argues that the
Senate continues to represent state interests by obstructing treaties, but Swaine convincingly challenges that
argument, explaining that obstructionism has “no necessary connection with any genuine commitment to
federalism.” Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 413 n.31 (citing Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 2, at
1294-99).
59
Anderson, supra note 49, at 232.
60
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1510-11 (1994).
61
Kramer, Putting Politics, supra note 58, at 224-25.
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The courts have also limited the state voice in foreign affairs. The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that states do not exist in relation to foreign affairs in its 1937 United States v.
Belmont decision.62 Belmont arose from the following facts: In 1918, the Soviet Union
nationalized a number of its corporations.63 One of these corporations had a deposit account with
Belmont, a private banker in New York. In 1933, the Soviet Union assigned, via an international
compact, its interest in the account (and numerous other assets) to the United States.64 Under the
agreement, the United States would inform the Soviet Union of all amounts that it realized under
the assignment.65 The goal of the agreement was to bring about settlement of rival claims
between the two countries.66 The appellate court held that the assignment violated a New York
policy prohibiting enforcement of confiscatory degrees issued by foreign governments.67 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, and held that “[i]n respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of foreign affairs generally, state lines disappear. As to
such purposes the state of New York does not exist.”68 This was not the first time that the Court
ruled that states did not have a voice in resisting the unwanted effects of the federal
government’s foreign affairs decisions, and there is a line of cases dismissing state concerns
going back to the first half of the nineteenth century.69
One case, in particular, stands out. The Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Holland70 in
1920. In Holland, Justice Holmes ruled that a treaty, and the federal statute implementing it, that

62

301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Ku, supra note 3, at 459.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 326-27.
67
United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 543 (1936).
68
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
69
See, e.g., Ku, supra note 3, at 459 nn.2-3 (citing Zchernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840)).
70
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
63
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regulated the hunting of migratory fowl could not be struck down because of federalism
concerns.71 This ruling came despite lower court decisions citing principles of federalism that
had rejected a similar federal statute enacted prior to the treaty.72 Holland has come to stand for
the principle that the federal government’s treaty power, unlike other constitutional powers, is
not subject to federalism limits.73
While this ruling gives the federal government enormous power in regards to its treaties,
Professor David M. Golove makes a lengthy and convincing argument that this is exactly what
the Framers intended.74 In order to prevent the abuse of treaties by states that was seen under the
Articles of Confederation, the Framers had good cause to adopt a system where treaties, once
adopted, could not be undermined.75 Without state advice and consent in deciding what treaties
to adopt, however, the Holland decision gives the federal government a broad treaty-making
power without regard for state concerns.
As indicated in the Introduction, the President and the Senate attempted to strengthen the
state role in the treaty process during the last two decades by introducing federalism reservations
to treaties and not seeking enforcement of ICJ rulings.76 While these methods have put the
United States in tension with international law, that tension is the product of political
decisionmaking and not the result of the fundamental structure of U.S. law. First, if the federal
government were concerned about the legality of the federalism reservations, it could simply
withdraw them. Second, while the Clinton administration insisted that it could not force the
71

Id. at 433-34 (specifically holding that the treaty did not violate some “invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment”) (cited for the same proposition in Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415).
72
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415 (citing United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292-96 (D. Kan.
1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914)).
73
See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 423 (citing Holland as the basis for arguments that the federal
government’s foreign affairs powers are not subject to any constitutional limitations).
74
Golove, Treaty-Making, supra note 2, at 1102-49.
75
Id. at 1132. Golove particularly applauds the Court’s opinion in Holland, stating that it “ought rightly to be
celebrated as among the greatest of the Court’s decisions.” Id. at 1266.
76
See supra text accompanying notes 7-23.
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states to comply with ICJ rulings,77 the federal government has successfully sued states to force
compliance in the past.78 Thus, the federal government appears to maintain the final word as to
whether or not the United States meets its treaty obligations and has merely made a political
choice at times to favor state interests over international obligations.79
The nature of U.S. incapacity to meet obligations could change, however, if the Supreme
Court applies certain substantive, procedural, and remedial limits on the federal treaty power that
appear to follow from the Court’s federalism jurisprudence in other areas. These limits would
formalize state power in the treaty process, while making compliance with international
obligations substantially more difficult.80 In my analysis of these limits, I rely on a recent and
comprehensive article by Professor Edward T. Swaine.81
The first of these limits involves a potential reassessment by the Court of the broad
holding in Missouri v. Holland.82 Swaine cites a series of recent cases for the proposition that the
Supreme Court might take a step back from Holland and apply some type of federalism limit to

77

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Malvina Halberstam, The Constitutional Authority of the Federal Government in State Criminal Proceedings that
Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign Relations, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (citing
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d. 925 (4th Cir.
1982)). Ku argues that such suits have only been brought to enforce treaties that were self-executing and thus don’t
apply to the ICJ orders, which he argues are non-self executing. Ku, supra note 3, at 517-18. Ku states that the only
other times the federal government has sued to enforce treaty obligations have been in cases involving American
Indian treaties where the federal government was considered a “guardian” of Indian interests. Id. at 491 n.174, 517
n.301 (citing United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975)). The Bush administration apparently believes it has the authority to force state compliance, having ordered
state courts to review the cases of foreign nationals denied consular notification rights. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Texas has questioned the constitutionality of the administration’s decision, Supreme Court to
Hear, supra note 28, and the issue will most likely be brought before a court before long.
79
See Halberstam, Constitutional Authority, supra note 78, at 5 (“Although the practice in the United States is
apparently for the Secretary of State to forward requests regarding non-imposition of the death penalty to the state in
which the accused is to be tried, that is a matter of policy, not constitutional requirement.”); cf. Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 675, 679
(1998) (arguing that whether or not federalism trumps international affairs is a decision for the political branches to
make).
80
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 408.
81
Id.
82
See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
78
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the federal government’s power to make and implement treaties.83 Professor Curtis A. Bradley
believes that this limit should in part take the form of that found in United States v. Lopez, City
of Boerne v. Flores, and United States v. Morrison.84 In those cases, the Court struck down
federal legislation as exceeding the powers granted under the Commerce Clause and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,85 reasoning that without some limits the federal government
would have an unchecked police power86 and interfere in areas of traditional state concern.87 The
ruling in Holland explicitly rejects the application of federalism principles used to limit
Congress’s authority in other areas to the treaty power,88 and Bradley states that the case would,

83

Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 415-16 (citing Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
84
Bradley summarizes his argument in Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 45, at 100-01 (arguing that the
best rule for applying federalism limits to the treaty power “would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude
treaties on any subject but would limit their ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress’s power
to do so”); see Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 456 (explaining “the option I favor, would be to
subject the treaty power to the same federalism restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers. Under this
approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory powers on the federal government, just the
power to bind the United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to resurrect
legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers, such as the legislation at
issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions”). Bradley incorporated Morrison into his
argument in Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra, at 115-17. For a brief description of Bradley’s position, see
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 418-19.
85
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (holding that the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded
Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (holding that
Congress did not have power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause).
86
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.”); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“‘[I]f we were to
accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate.’” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)).
87
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (“‘Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional
state concern . . . the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur . . . .’” (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (characterizing RFRA as “a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens”). My characterization in this and the preceding footnote of the reasoning in
Lopez and Morrison is based on my analysis of those cases in Cyril Robert Emery, Note, Setting Boundaries for
Extraterritorial Applications of the Property Clause: An Assessment of an Alternative Source of Authority for
Environmental Regulations, 79 IND. L. J. 515 (2004).
88
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920).
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therefore, have to be overturned.89 Although Swaine suggests more subtle strategies the Court
might use to limit Holland,90 he agrees its reversal is a possibility.91 The reversal of Holland
would protect states by preventing U.S. enforcement of treaties that circumvent traditional limits
on federal power. For example, in reference to Holland, the federal government could no longer
rely on its treaty power to enforce a migratory bird statute that Congress could not implement
with its commerce power.92 While Holland’s reversal might protect state interests, it would
seriously interfere with U.S. ability to meet treaty obligations. If federal legislation implementing
older treaties were struck down as violating federalism principles, the United States would find
itselfwithout a means of enforcing those treaties and would, therefore, be in violation of its
obligations.
The potential procedural limit on the treaty power arises from the Court’s recent
application of the anticommandeering principle. In New York v. United States93 and Printz v.
United States,94 the Supreme Court ruled that when legislating under the commerce power the
federal government may not direct state legislatures to adopt regulatory programs or force state
officials to actively enforce federal laws. If this rule were applied to the treaty power, it could
prevent implementation of treaties such as the VCCR. The United States ratified the VCCR in

89

Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 45, at 100-01.
First, he submits that the Court might presume when examining treaties that the federal government did not intend
to exceed its general legislative history. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 422. Second, he proposes that the
Court might more closely scrutinize whether certain provisions of implementing legislation are necessary to fulfill a
treaty’s obligations. Id.
91
As Swaine recognizes, an essential part of the Holland decision is that the decision’s author, Justice Holmes,
assumes that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to creating implementing legislation
for any treaty the federal government has ratified. Id. at 419 n.66. Swaine argues that the Supreme Court has been
much less indulgent of late in reading the Necessary and Proper Clause, opening the door for that part of Holland to
be overturned. Id. at 420-21.
92
Migratory bird legislation enacted before ratification of the Migratory Bird Treaty had been found to exceed
Congress’s commerce power. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (cited in Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 415).
93
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
94
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
90
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1969. The treaty is self-executing95 and, thus, went into force as national law immediately
without the need for legislative implementation.96 The VCCR, however, entails a certain measure
of active implementation because one of its provisions requires that officials notify arrested
foreign nationals of their right to communicate with their consulate.97 In the Committee on
Foreign Relations’ report on the VCCR, members of the Senate recognized that the states would
need to fulfill some of the treaty’s obligations because state officers control many arrests.98
While state enforcement of the VCCR has not been particularly effective,99 it appears to be the
only practical method of adopting the treaty.100 If the anticommandeering principle were applied
to the VCCR, however, the federal government could not ask state officers to fulfill the treaty’s
obligations.101 The federal government would be left with the impractical option of performing
95

E.g., Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.Supp.2d 417, 423 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Vázquez, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 33, at 695 (stating that “[a]t a general level, a self-executing treaty
may be defined as a treaty that may be enforced in the courts without prior legislation by Congress”).
97
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
98
Senators James William Fulbright and Philip Clifford Case implicitly recognized the need for state
implementation when they asked Deputy Legal Advisor J. Edward Lyerly, “[h]ow does the State Department notify
State and local jurisdictions of the provisions of consular treaties so that they know which consuls (if any) to notify
when they arrest a foreign national?,” S. Exec Rep. No. 91-9, app., at 24 (1969) (statement of Deputy Legal Adviser
J. Edward Lyerly) (cited by William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 268 (1998), for a similar proposition).
99
For example, in 2004, the ICJ found that U.S. officials had failed to notify fifty-one Mexicans of their consular
rights upon arrest. Avena Final Order, supra note 17, at 611 ¶ 106(1). While this may seem like a small number, the
ICJ was only concerned with inmates on death row. There are presumably many more non-death row inmates who
were not notified of consular rights.
100
Chad Thornberry, Federalism v. Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 107, 125 (1999); see Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 1, at 432 n.115 (stating that, in regards to the VCCR, the United States “could have more
actively supervised state and local officials, or hired a third party to do so, but the size and complexity of such an
undertaking would be staggering”).
101
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (1999)
[hereinafter Vázquez, The Treaty Power]. Although the anticommandeering principle would have a negative impact
on U.S. ability to meet treaty obligations, its benefits for state interests are perhaps limited. While the principle
would prevent the federal government from burdening states with certain treaty obligations, it could also prevent the
federal government from seeking federalism reservations designed to protect states. Federalism reservations protect
states not only by potentially allowing them to choose whether to implement treaties at all, see supra note 13 and
accompanying text, but also by giving them flexibility to implement treaties in a manner they see fit. See supra note
12 and accompanying text. According to Professor Carlos Manuel Vázquez, if applied in the treaty context, the
anticommandeering principle would render federalism reservations unconstitutional because they leave legislative
implementation of treaties to states thus commandeering state legislatures. Vázquez, The Treaty Power, supra, at
1354-56. If this came to pass and the federal government still wished to implement a treaty to which reservations
were attached, it could enforce the treaty directly using federal officials instead of state legislatures. This would
96
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the notifications102 or the unattractive choice of breaching the treaty and accepting the
consequences.103
Of the federalism limits on the treaty power that the Court could potentially adopt, the
application of the state sovereign immunity doctrine as a remedial limit seems the most probable
and imminent. In two cases arising from the ICJ disputes mentioned above, the Supreme Court
issued dicta stating that under the Eleventh Amendment foreign governments probably cannot
sue states for violations of a treaty.104 If these dicta are followed, it will mean that foreign nations
and nationals cannot sue states to meet treaty obligations that have been assigned to those states
through federalism reservations or simply by default, as in the case of the VCCR.105 By not
providing remedies to certain treaty violations, the United States would potentially be in further
breach of these treaties and even more at odds with international law.106
If any of these judicial limits on the federal treaty power come to pass, they would legally
cement a preference for states’ rights over international obligations and make the federal
government’s compliance with treaties very difficult. One would hope, however, that the Court,
as much as the federal government, would prefer a method of incorporating federalism in the
treaty process that neither undermines international obligations nor too severely challenges the
legal structure that has been built to protect the states.

harm states by taking away their control over implementation of these treaties, leaving them at the mercy of the
federal government’s enforcement techniques.
102
See supra note 100.
103
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 432. Those consequences would not include being dragged into the
ICJ now that the Bush administration has withdrawn the United States from the optional protocol giving the ICJ
jurisdiction over conflicts arising under the VCCR. Liptak, supra note 26, at A16. International relations
consequences would, of course, remain.
104
Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377
(1998); see also Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 435 (citing these cases for the same principle).
105
Swaine Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 438.
106
Id. at 438-41 (explaining that application of state sovereign immunity could threaten certain treaties that have
provisions requiring remedies, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
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Academic responses to the current U.S. tension between federalism and treaty obligations
tend toward absolutism. For example, if Professor Bradley’s suggestion that Holland should be
reversed were accepted, states would exercise a vast new power in reviewing treaties that would
severely hamper the federal government’s ability to meet obligations and surely solidify the U.S.
reputation as an international scofflaw. To avoid this, the U.S. federal government could simply
adopt a practice of not ratifying any treaties that implicate state interests. This practice would
prevent U.S. conflicts with international law, but would not meet the federal government’s
needs. For example, the federal government has shown an interest in adopting human rights
treaties107 and, despite the federalism concerns raised by these treaties,108 continues to consider
signing and ratifying them.109
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Bradley’s suggestion are assertions that the
states have no place in foreign affairs.110 These assertions, however, neither account for the
Framers’ intent nor the commitment by the federal government to include states in the treaty
process. Outside of these absolutist arguments, scholars have suggested giving states the ability
to form their own international agreements as a method of reconciling federalism and
international obligations.
107

See Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 402-03 (identifying various human rights treaties that have
been adopted or considered by the federal government); Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at
414 (stating that “[a]s for the desirability of ratifying human rights treaties, presidents and the Senate have agreed
that a failure by the United States to ratify the major human rights treaties would result in . . . foreign policy costs”).
108
Human rights treaties tend to implicate traditional areas of state concern, such as criminal and family law. Spiro,
supra note 24, at 568; see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1674-75 (1997) (stating that human rights treaties “have numerous potential conflicts with state law”).
109
For example, the current Bush administration initially supported ratification of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, although the administration has now withdrawn that support.
Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 607,
614-15 (making the point that the Bush administration has generally taken no positive action on human rights
treaties under consideration). For other evidence of federal interest in human rights treaties, see Ku, supra note 3, at
463 (citing the examples from Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 402-03, mentioned supra in note
103).
110
See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 1129 n.1 (citing, but not agreeing with, e.g.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 150; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §4-6, at
230 (2d ed. 1988)).
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For example, Professor Swaine and others advance the revival of state-foreign
compacts.111 Under the Constitution, the states may, with the approval of Congress, form
compacts with foreign nations.112 Compacts have rarely been used, but Swaine argues that if
federal authority to implement treaties or require states to implement them is lacking, the federal
government could have states fill the gap by forming international agreements covering the same
subject matter.113 For example, if the Court finds that the anticommandeering principle
invalidates the VCCR, Swaine suggests that the states could, with Congress’s permission,
intervene and negotiate with foreign nations to form compacts granting consular notification
rights.114
While theoretically sound, state agreements with foreign nations present grave practical
difficulties. These difficulties arise because the nature of the agreements that states would most
likely be called upon to make. Considering the federal government’s federalism worries
regarding human rights agreements,115 such agreements would seem especially suitable for stateforeign compacts. Human rights compacts, though, would likely prove impractical because they
purport to guarantee individual rights.116 Consider Swaine’s example of the VCCR. Just as
111

Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 494; see Anderson, supra note 49, at 245-47.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power. . . .”). Historically, Congress has been granted broad leeway in
determining the method of its consent. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 501-02 (citing evidence for
Congress’s ability to consent in the manner of its own choosing).
113
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 510. The requirement of congressional approval would prevent states
from entering agreements that would undermine the federal government’s foreign affairs goals. See id. at 503-05
(explaining the various ways Congress can control state-foreign compacts).
114
Id. at 522-23.
115
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 282, 287 (2002) (stating that “when ratifying human rights treaties, the President and Senate routinely
attach federalism understandings providing that the treaties will be implemented in a manner consistent with our
federal system of government”).
116
For context, consider the following:
Until recently, international law has exclusively focused on states. Individuals did not have rights
under international law. In the last fifty years, a large number of states have ratified treaties that
deal with individual human rights, such as the Genocide Convention, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention on Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. All of these protect individual human rights.
112
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human rights treaties guarantee individual rights, the VCCR entitles individuals to be notified of
their right to communicate with their consulate.117 If the VCCR were struck down and states
entered into compacts, they could certainly provide foreign arrestees with consular notification.
The foreign nations that agreed to the compact, however, would have no way of providing
reciprocity for this or any other compact guaranteeing individual rights because it is extremely
difficult to satisfactorily identify the state citizenship of U.S. citizens.118 Passports are not statespecific and the most common legal test concerning state citizenship rests on the intent of the
person in question.119 Without some type of reform, therefore, foreign nations would be unable
to identify whether a U.S. citizen came from the state party to the compact or a state that did not
grant consular notification rights. At best, the foreign nation could only provide uncertain
implementation of the agreement that would occasionally deny benefits to deserving arrestees.
This is not an insurmountable problem, but it does present a significant practical barrier
because the entire structure of U.S. state citizenship would have to be revised in order for states
Malvina Halberstam, The Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to an Action Against the French
Railroad for Transporting Thousands of Jews and Others to Their Deaths: Abrams v. SNCF, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV.
1, 6-7 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
117
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; see also
LaGrand Final Order, supra note 17, at 1102 ¶ 128(4) (holding that by not notifying Karl and Walter LaGrand of
their rights under the VCCR, the United States violated its obligation to the brothers).
118
The Fourteenth Amendment states, “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, §1. This would imply that individuals are citizens of the states wherein they reside. The Supreme Court,
however, resisted this definition of state citizenship in the area where the issue comes up most: determining state
citizenship for the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3611 (3rd ed. 1998 & Supp. 2004) (citing Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), the federal district courts have jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different
states dealing with claims over a certain minimum amount. Rather than strictly define state citizenship, courts have
decided that for “diversity purposes, state citizenship is essentially synonymous with domicile.” Peter B. Oh, A
Jurisdictional Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 455 (2003). Courts
generically hold that “domicile of a person is the place where he has his true, fixed home and principal
establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Wright, supra, at § 3612.
Predictably, considering the requirement of looking at intent, this test has been criticized as being too difficult to
apply. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1968) (stating
that “[d]omicile is an unsatisfactory test for American state citizenship . . . because it is difficult to determine”); see
also Wright, supra, at § 3612 (cataloging some of the difficulties courts face determining intent). Considering the
mountain of judicial decisions addressing the issue, see Wright, supra, at § 3612, it would seem that courts struggle
to apply the domicile rule, and foreign officials could hardly be expected to do any better.
119
See supra note 118 (explaining the role of intent in determining state citizenship).
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to create effective agreements with foreign nations. The United States could adopt state-specific
passports and more rigid legal definitions of state citizenship; in the face of such extreme
measures, however, the question arises whether there is a more practical method of reconciling
state interests and international obligations.
II. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN TREATY MAKING PROCESS
Like the United States, Australia has adopted recent reforms to give states a greater role
in the treaty process. While the two nations have similar constitutional frameworks, the
Australian reforms have focused on state advice as opposed to federalism reservations or
declarations of federal incapacity. In this section, relying on an article by Brian R. Opeskin and
Donald R. Rothwell,120 I provide a comparison of the two systems. I then examine the recent
Australian reforms and evaluate their efficacy.
Just as in the United States, the drafters of the Australian Constitution provided for
federal authority in foreign affairs. Whereas the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were explicit in
giving predominance to the federal government in treaty matters,121 the Australian Framers had
cause to be more circumspect. When the Australian Constitution became effective in 1901,
Australia’s foreign relations were still controlled by the Imperial government, and the
Constitution’s drafters were wary about including provisions explicitly relating to the power to
make treaties.122 Nonetheless, Sections 51 and 61 of the Constitution have come to stand for the
proposition that the federal government has the final word in treaty matters.
Section 61 of the Constitution states, “The executive power of the Commonwealth is
vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative,
and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the
120

Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
122
Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 429-30.
121
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Commonwealth.”123 As Opeskin and Rothwell explain, this archaic clause gives the current
Australian executive branch, as embodied by the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet, the
foreign affairs powers that were previously held by the Queen, including the authority to make
and terminate treaties.124 This provision, although vastly more opaque, mirrors Article II, Section
2, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution.125 Thus, just like the U.S. President, the Australian Prime
Minister makes treaties. The Constitutions differ, however, in that the Australian Prime Minister
can ratify treaties without legislative branch consent.126
The Australian Federal Legislature, like the U.S. Congress, is an organ of enumerated
powers and is delegated the power over “external affairs” under Section 51 of the
Constitution.127 The Australian High Court has interpreted this power to include the ability to
implement basically any treaty signed and ratified by the Prime Minister.128 This essentially
gives the Australian Federal Legislature the same broad power to implement treaties granted to
the U.S. Congress in Missouri v. Holland. Unlike the default rule of self-execution in the United
States, treaties are non-self-executing in Australia and, therefore, require legislative
implementation to become binding domestically.129 To avoid the international embarrassment of

123

AUSTL. CONST. ch. 2, § 61.
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 4-5.
125
Giving the President the power to enter into treaties with advice and consent of the Senate.
126
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 5.
127
“The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to: . . . External Affairs . . . .” AUSTL. CONST. ch. 1, pt. 5, § 51, cl.
29.
128
“The upshot of the High Court’s interpretation of federal legislative power over external affairs is that Parliament
does not lack power to implement treaties to which Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever their subject
matter.” Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12. Opeskin & Rothwell come to this conclusion
based on High Court decisions in Queensland v. Commonwealth (1989) 167 C.L.R. 232; Richardson v. Forestry
Comm’n (1988) 164 C.L.R. 261; Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1; Koonwarta v. Bjelke-Petersen
(1982) 153 C.L.R. 168. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 11.
129
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 6-8.
124
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ratifying a treaty that the Federal Legislature won’t implement, the Prime Minister generally
assures that legislation will be passed prior to ratification.130
The states can also implement treaties, and in some cases are better situated to do so.131
For this reason, the Australian Federal Legislature sometimes leaves the responsibility to them,
just as the U.S. federal government leaves treaty implementation to the U.S. states on
occasion.132 Nevertheless, under the Australian Constitution, if a state fails to implement a treaty,
the Federal Legislature can always choose to enact pre-empting legislation.133 Neither U.S. nor
Australian states can independently form treaties with foreign nations.134
Thus, just like the U.S. federal government since adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the Australian federal government historically possessed sole authority to negotiate
and ratify treaties and the power to implement them. While this model provided the federal
government with the tools to meet its treaty obligations, it did little to protect states’ interests. In
1975, two treaties that impinged on traditional areas of state concern regarding the environment
and human rights entered into force in Australia: the Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (hereinafter the World Heritage Convention)135 and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.136 The states

130

Id. at 6.
Id. at 15-17.
132
Ku, supra note 3, at 477-526 (cataloging a variety of areas in which states have implemented treaties through
legislation or otherwise); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that it makes practical sense
that the states implement some of the VCCR obligations).
133
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 16 n.69 (citing AUSTL. CONST. ch. 5, § 109).
134
As for Australia, consider Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 13 (citing New South Wales
v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337; Commonwealth v. New South
Wales (1923) 32 C.L.R. 200; for principle that Australian states have no legal personality and cannot enter into
treaties). In the United States, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 prohibits states from entering into treaties.
135
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, entered into force Nov. 17, 1975, 27
U.S.T. 37, 1975 Austl. T.S. No. 47. Like Opeskin & Rothwell, I give the Australian Treaty Series citations for
Australian treaties. These citations indicate the year when the treaty entered force in Australia.
136
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force Jan. 4,
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 1975 Austl. T.S. No. 40. Opeskin & Rothwell cites this treaty and others as covering
131
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challenged federal implementation of these treaties as exceeding federal authority under Section
51 of the Constitution, but the High Court repeatedly ruled against them.137 It held that, as long
as the obligation was bona fide and not an overt attempt to enhance the power of the Federal
Parliament, the implementing legislation was valid.138 While the bona fiderequirement hints at a
potential limitation on the Federal Parliament’s power to implement treaties, the Australian High
Court has yet to strike down treaty legislation as exceeding federal authority.
Although the High Court has not offered the states legal protection from the
implementation of treaties affecting their traditional areas of concern, procedural changes in
treaty making have made up for it, at least in part. These changes began in 1976 with the election
of a conservative government that was dedicated to a policy of “cooperative federalism.”139 This
policy manifested itself in various attempts to include states in the treaty process. In 1977, for
example, proposals were made to give states an advisory role in the negotiation and ratification
of treaties.140 During that same year, the Australian federal government published Guidelines on
Treaty Consultation stating that the government would pursue federalism reservations where
appropriate.141 While the use of federalism reservations was quickly abandoned,142 state advice

“subject areas that were traditionally regarded as falling within state competence, namely human rights and the
environment.” Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 10-11.
137
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 11-12 (citing Queensland v. Commonwealth (1989)
167 C.L.R. 232; Richardson v. Forestry Comm’n (1988) 164 C.L.R. 261; Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158
C.L.R. 1; Koonwarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168).
138
For example, in Richardson v. Forestry Commission (1988) 164 C.L.R. 261, Justice Gaudron summarizes the
High Court’s position as follows:
The fact that Australia is a party to a treaty (leaving to one side a treaty which is not entered into
bona fide) will itself suffice to engage the power to legislate with respect to external affairs, and will
authorize the passing of a law so long as that law is reasonably capable of being viewed as
conducive to the purpose of the treaty if it is also reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate,
or adapted to, the circumstance which engages the power.
Id. at 343 (Gaudron, J.); see Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12.
139
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 18-19.
140
Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.19; Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 14.
141
Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 18-19 (citing Henry Burmester, Federal Clauses: An
Australian Perspective, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 522, 534 (1985)).
142
In 1983, the newly elected labour government rejected the use of federalism reservations in the “Principles and
Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties” (hereinafter “Principles and Procedures”) agreed to
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in treaty making is the hallmark of Australia’s current “Principles and Procedures for
Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties” (hereinafter “Principles and Procedures”) agreed
to by the state Premiers143 and the federal government as part of broad Australian treaty reform
in 1996.144
The basic mechanism for state advice under the “Principles and Procedures” is the
Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Treaties (hereinafter State Standing
Committee).145 The State Standing Committee is a body of federal officials and senior officers
from the various states that meets at least twice a year.146 Every six months, the federal
government is required to provide the states a list of current and upcoming treaty negotiations.147
The State Standing Committee examines this list and identifies treaties of importance to the
states and proposes mechanisms for involving the states in the negotiation of those treaties.148 It
also coordinates state representation on relevant treaty delegations.149 Finally, it reports on the
implementation of treaties that have implications for the states.150

by the state Premiers and the Commonwealth government. Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.8. According to the
“Principles and Procedures,” the international community viewed the reservations with contempt and as simply a
method of evading international obligations. Id. This has been the official Australian position ever since. Principles
and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 8.1 (stating Australian position regarding federalism reservations in the current
version of the “Principles and Procedures”); see also Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 1819 (making same claim in 1995 and citing 1992 “Principles and Procedures” as evidence).
143
Premiers are the Australian equivalent of U.S. state Governors.
144
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16. There have been several incarnations of the “Principles and
Procedures,” this is only the most recent. Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶¶ 13.8, 13.19. For a basic review of the
1996 treaty reforms, see Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-44.
145
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5.4-5.5; Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.22.
146
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 5.4; Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.22. The State Standing
Committee “consists of representatives from the Premier’s or Chief Minister’s Departments in every State and
Territory. [The State Standing Committee] is chaired by a senior official of the Prime Minister’s Department and
also has representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Attorney General’s Department.”
Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Web site,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/making/making2.html.
147
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 4.2(b); Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.23.
148
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 5.4; Trick or Treaty?, supra note 40, ¶ 13.22.
149
Id.
150
Id.

29

TREATY SOLUTIONS FROM THE LAND DOWN UNDER

The “Principles and Procedures” incorporate other significant mechanisms for state
advice as well. In 1996 the Australian Senate adopted a resolution requiring the preparation of a
National Interest Analysis (hereinafter NIA) for every treaty tabled in Parliament.151 NIAs are
the procedural equivalent of Environmental Impact Statements in the United States.152
Essentially, they are publicly available documents created by the federal government detailing
the benefits and drawbacks of adopting a treaty under consideration.153 The “Principles and
Procedures” require the federal government to consult with the states during the preparation of
NIAs for treaties that implicate state interests.154
As part of the 1996 reforms, the Australian federal government also established a Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties (hereinafter JSCOT).155 JSCOT releases reports on matters
arising from treaties and NIAs.156 Although JSCOT is made up of members of the Federal
Parliament who, like U.S. Senators, do not represent state interests, it has made a habit of
reviewing and commenting on the federal government’s consultations with states during the
treaty process.157 JSCOT’s close scrutiny of the consultations gives the states an additional layer

151

Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40 (citing Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General,
Government Announces Reform of Treaty-Making, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Release FA 29
(May 2, 1996) [hereinafter Reform of Treaty-Making], available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/1996/fa29.html). Under the reforms every treaty signed by Australia
must be tabled in Parliament at least fifteen days before it can be ratified. Id.
152
For more on EISs, see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
153
Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40; Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Web Site
[hereinafter JSCOT Web Site], http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/ppgrole.htm.
154
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 4.2(c).
155
JSCOT Web Site, supra note 153; see Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 439-40 (citing Reform of Treaty-Making,
supra note 151).
156
JSCOT Web Site, supra note 153; see Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 441.
157
For the most in-depth review, see Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, Report 61: The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement ¶¶ 3.43-3.63 (June 2004) [hereinafter
Report 61] (reviewing consultations between states and Commonwealth during negotiations leading up to the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement), http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm. See
also Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 60: Treaties
Tabled on 2 March 2004 ¶¶ 3.21-3.23 (May 2004) (briefly reviewing state consultations on the World Tourism
Organization), http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm; Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 62: Treaties Tabled on 30 March 2004 ¶¶ 2.50-2.53
(Aug. 2004) (briefly reviewing state consultations on the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the
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of procedural protection, and its publicly available reports, in combination with the NIAs, make
information about treaty making more readily available to the general population.158
Finally, the “Principles and Procedures” establishes a Treaties Council.159 The Treaties
Council is made up of the Australian Prime Minister and the Premiers of each state and provides
an opportunity for the states to suggest federal adoption of treaties and discuss treaties referred to
it by the State Standing Committee.160 The Treaties Council is required to meet every year but, in
fact, has met just once since its establishment.161 This lapse may appear to tarnish the reforms,
but a recent article suggests that it possibly reflects the success of the State Standing Committee,
which has simply not felt the need to refer treaties to the Treaties Council.162
Despite criticism that the Treaties Council has not met frequently enough,163 state
involvement through the NIAs and the State Standing Committee has received positive reviews
from the states. For example, in JSCOT’s 1999 report on the treaty process, New South Wales
Legislative Council member Hon. Ronald Dyer stated that the State Standing Committee
“mechanism at a bureaucratic level appears to be working well. The officials are meeting
regularly, and that is excellent.”164 The representative from Tasmania, a state that has particularly

Government of New Zealand for the Establishment of a Joint Scheme for the regulation of Therapeutic Products),
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report.htm.
158
Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 440-41.
159
Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5.1-5.3.
160
Id. ¶¶ 5.1-5.4. In the context of the United States, imagine the President formally meeting with the Governors of
every state and discussing treaties.
161
Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.61.
162
Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 440-41.
163
See Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.61 (presenting Western Australian and Australian Capital Territory
submissions suggesting that the Treaties Council should meet more often); Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 24: A Seminar on the Role of Parliaments in Treaty Making,
Appendix C - Seminar Transcript 47 (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Report 24] (statement of Hon. Ronald Dyer, member
of New South Wales Legislative Council and Chair of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice) (also suggesting
the Treaties Council should meet more often),
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/reports/report24/report24.pdf.
164
Report 24, supra note 163, Appendix C - Seminar Transcript 47 (statement of Hon. Ronald Dyer, member of
New South Wales Legislative Council and Chair of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice). As mentioned in
the previous note, Mr. Dyer also suggested that the Treaties Council should meet more often. Id.
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suffered from the effects of treaties,165 was not as positive, but nevertheless did “congratulate the
federal government for having introduced the measures.”166
More recently, JSCOT released a report on the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement that reviewed state participation during the negotiations.167 The Agreement is of
general significance to the states, but especially relevant are government procurement provisions
that require the states adhere to certain procedures when considering bids for government
contracts.168 While the states were disappointed by the level of consultation at the end of and
after the negotiation process,169 the NIA indicated that the states were active in framing
negotiation objectives170 and were included as observers during the actual negotiations.171
Furthermore, JSCOT found that most states were generally pleased with the amount of
consultation and had praised the federal government’s efforts “to be more inclusive than during
previous negotiations.”172 The process of state advice in Australia seems, therefore, to be a work
in progress but on the way to fulfilling state concerns regarding treaties.
The Australian model of state advice is not a panacea in terms of balancing states’
interests and international obligations. First, the Australian reforms are merely procedural, and
165

Tasmania has had laws and projects struck down because of interpretation of treaties. First, in 1983, the High
Court determined that Australia’s membership in the World Heritage Convention prohibited Tasmania from building
a potentially lucrative dam. Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1; Report 24, supra note 163, Appendix
C - Seminar Transcript 47-48 (statement of Hon. Ray Bailey, President of the Tasmanian Legislative Council). More
recently, the federal government passed a law preempting Tasmania’s anti-sodomy laws in order to come into
compliance with the ICCPR. See Report 24, supra, Appendix C - Seminar Transcript 48 (statement of Hon. Ray
Bailey, President of the Tasmanian Legislative Council); Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 436.
166
Report 24, supra note 163, Appendix C - Seminar Transcript 47-48 (statement of Hon. Ray Bailey, President of
the Tasmanian Legislative Council).
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Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.41-3.63.
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Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., ch. 15, available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-text/index.html [hereinafter AUSFTA]; Report 61, supra note
157, ¶ 3.44.
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Report 61, supra note 157, ¶¶ 3.53, 3.55-3.60.
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National Interest Analysis, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, [2004] ATNIA 5, annex 1 [hereinafter
ATNIA], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/nia/2004/5/annex1.html; see Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.48.
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ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1; Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.54. But see Report 61, supra, ¶ 3.55 (citing
some state complaints about involvement in negotiations).
172
Report 61, supra note 157, ¶ 3.53.
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the federal government can always ignore state advice173 or, in an emergency, ratify a treaty
without it.174 As Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hon. Alexander Downer said in 2000,
however, “we would obviously try to get a consensus amongst the states and territories before
ratifying a treaty which is of relevance to them.”175 Second, the states can also undermine the
goals of the system by delaying or enacting faulty legislation when asked to implement a
treaty.176 Despite these concerns, however, the Australian model is functioning and has created a
balance between state interests and international obligations that sacrifices neither.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR U.S. ADOPTION OF AUSTRALIAN TREATY REFORMS
Although successful in Australia, would state advice be an appropriate remedy for the
dilemma facing the United States over the proper place of federalism in treaty making? U.S.
adoption of state advice certainly has historic charm as the Framers’ intended the President to
consult with the states before signing treaties.177 Washington’s quick dismissal of the practice
and the Seventeenth Amendment’s final exclusion of states from any role in the treaty process,
however, tend to undermine the strength of an originalist argument for adopting the Australian
reforms. But that should not prove fatal to an argument in their favor. Australia adopted the
reforms without reference to historic precedent. More significantly, in 1994, the U.S. federal
government enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (hereinafter URAA), which
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The People’s Process, supra note 42, at 7 (statement of Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs);
see also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and International Treaty Making Information Kit,
Review of the Treaty-Making Process ¶ 6.6 (explaining why Australian states don’t have a formal role in treaty
making) [hereinafter Treaty Making Information Kit], http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/infokit.html.
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Consider Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer’s statement in The People’s Process, supra
note 42, at 5, explaining that in an emergency the federal government could sign and ratify a treaty without it being
tabled in Parliament for the requisite fifteen days. In such a situation, there would be no time for states to be
consulted.
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Id. at 7.
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Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 20.
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See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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implements the treaty of the same name.178 The Uruguay Round Agreements establish many of
the provisions that together form the World Trade Organization. The URAA requires the U.S.
Trade Representative to consider state advice when formulating U.S. positions that affect state
concerns on trade issues arising from the Uruguay Round Agreements.179 The federal
government’s adoption of an act entailing state consultation in certain circumstances shows that
it is neither unwilling nor unable to pursue state advice on matters of importance to the states.
Furthermore, adoption of a JSCOT-like joint standing committee to review and report on treaties
would be in line with congressional practice establishing numerous committees and subcommittees to oversee everything from agriculture to veterans’ affairs.180
A. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S. States
Regardless of precedent, U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms would have significant
concrete benefits for the states and the federal government. As far as the states are concerned, the
greatest benefit would be the opportunity to access and consult on any treaty of importance to the
states.181
This opportunity would, in some ways, provide the states broader protection than either
the implementation of Swaine’s state-foreign compacts;182 the federal government’s continued
use of federalism reservations; or the reversal of Holland, Professor Bradley’s extreme proposal
for reform.183 These schemes are all deficient because they only provide states with protection in
limited circumstances. State-foreign compacts must be authorized by Congress, and, thus, can
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2000).
19 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(1)(B) (the URAA is also cited by Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 421 n.71, for
this principle).
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Consider the U.S. Senate Web site,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/committees_home.htm.
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See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text for a description of how state advice works in Australia.
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See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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only be adopted on the federal government’s whim.184 Similarly, federalism reservations are
applied only when the federal government identifies a treaty as potentially interfering with state
sovereignty.185 Finally, while the reversal of Holland could prevent the adoption of treaties for
which there is no other federal authority,186 it would not affect the adoption of numerous other
treaties that have serious implications for the states. Consider, for example, treaties regulating
trade. There is little question that the federal government can adopt treaties relating to
commercial and trade matters under its Commerce Clause power and would continue to be able
to do so if Holland were overturned.187 Professor Bradley’s suggestion, therefore, offers no
protection in regards to these treaties even though they frequently have effects on traditional
areas of state concern.188 Under the Australian reforms, on the other hand, states could identify
and consult on any treaty that they determine to affect their interests, including trade agreements.
This is not to say that adopting the Australian reforms would unequivocally favor the
states. From a states’ rights perspective, the fundamental disadvantage to U.S. adoption of the
184

Consider Swaine’s explanation of the broad power Congress exercises over compacts:
Under existing case law and contemporary practice, the “treaties” proscribed to the states by the
Compact Clause effectively comprise those pacts to which Congress has not consented, and
“compacts” are anything to which [Congress] has consented.
Congress’s power of consent, indeed, permits it far more authority than a veto, and
includes the power to condition consent. Congress has employed that power to insist on federal
participation in compact negotiations, to delegate to the executive branch the authority so that it
may approve the compact and terminate it, to require federal participation in the administration of
the compact, and to require the return to Congress to approve additional parties. Indeed, it would
appear that Congress is permitted to stipulate in advance all the compact’s significant terms, a
principle vindicated by the lower courts in a case involving Landis and Frankfurter’s favorite
subject.
Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 503-05 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16 (discussing how the executive branch
and the Senate design and attach federalism reservations to treaties).
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See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 419 (explaining that such cases would be rare under current the
subject-matter federalism limitations on Congress).
187
Id. at 419 n.63.
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See, e.g., John Kincaid, Fifty Years of German Basic Law: The New Departure for Germany: The Domestication
of German Foreign Policy in the European Union, 53 SMU L. REV. 555, 560 (2000) (explaining that free-trade
agreements pose a particular threat to the constitutional powers of constituent governments in federal systems
because these governments exercise most of the powers that create non-tariff trade barriers that the agreements seek
to ban). The U.S. federal government has taken non-judicial measures to protect states in regards to free-trade
agreements. Consider, for example, the federal-state consultation measures mandated under the URAA. 19 U.S.C. §
3512 (b)(1)(B).
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Australian state advice system is that it would offer states no concrete legal protections. Using
the Australian model, state advice and NIAs would be purely non-binding procedures, and the
federal government could ignore them at will and continue to adopt treaties that interfere with
traditional areas of state concern.189 A fear of unimpeded federal action, however, underestimates
the effectiveness of procedural protections in U.S. law.
Consider, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter NEPA),
which requires federal agencies to produce non-binding Environmental Impact Statements
(hereinafter EISs) before taking action that might affect the environment.190 The Act is widely
emulated and praised for its effectiveness in alerting agency managers of environmental concerns
that might otherwise have been ignored.191 At best, it “opens governmental decisions to an
unprecedented level of public scrutiny,”192 and thus “creates powerful pressures on agency
decisionmakers to avoid the most environmentally damaging courses of action.”193
Similarly, if state concerns regarding a specific treaty were presented to the President or
Senate through consultation or a NIA, there would be considerable pressure on the federal
government not to ignore those concerns without significant countervailing federal interests.
There is evidence that this is the case in Australia, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs has said
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See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
Bradley C. Karkainnen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002) (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c),
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994)). NEPA requires, among other things, that EISs include statements on the impact of a
proposed action, adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if the action is undertaken, alternatives to the
action, and irreversible uses of resources predicated by the action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v).
191
Karkainnen, supra note 190, at 904-06 (presenting, but not agreeing with, praise of NEPA). NEPA has been
criticized as too costly and burdensome, but the appeal of its procedural nature has convinced even critics to propose
alternative procedural measures to replace it. See id. at 905-06 (rejecting NEPA but proposing an alternative “as
thoroughly procedural in character”).
192
Id. at 904-05 (attributing this characterization to NEPA’s supporters and citing, e.g., Jonathon Poisner, A Civic
Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L.
53, 54-55 (1996)).
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Id. at 905 (attributing this characterization to NEPA’s supporters).
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that the federal government has a strong preference for getting state approval before ratifying a
treaty.194
B. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S. Federal Government
Adoption of the Australian model would not only benefit state interests but would also,
through the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT reports, serve the public interest by bringing a
degree of transparency to a process that in the United States is renowned for being secretive and
autocratic.195 Furthermore, a paper trail could also serve the federal government’s interest in
meeting treaty obligations.
Consider a 1997 assertion by then Governor George W. Bush’s general counsel Alberto
R. Gonzalez that Texas was not responsible for assuring compliance with the VCCR, because it
had not signed the treaty.196 The Clinton administration appeared sensitive to this sort of rhetoric
when it decided not to force state compliance with the ICJ orders staying executions.197 If,
however, under an Australian advice model, Texas and other states had expressed satisfaction
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See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
According to Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch, “[t]he president-centered model has been dominant since the days
of President Washington, but in the more complex, globalized world of the twenty-first century, the treaty process
should not be a closed, secretive preserve, as if the president were an eighteenth-century monarch with the Senate
his coterie of courtiers.” Lori Fisler Damrosch, Treaties and International Regulation, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
349, 350 (2004). Damrosch notes that some progress has been made, especially in regards to trade agreements. Id.
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Al Kamen, Virtually Blushing, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997 at A17 (quoting general counsel Alberto R.
Gonzalez) (cited by Spiro, supra note 24, at 588, for the proposition that sub-national governments fail to consider
international law in decisionmaking). This statement foreshadowed an announcement by a spokesman for current
Texas Governor Rick Perry that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over Texas, and Texas would not abide by its rulings in
VCCR cases staying executions. The Nation Texas to Ignore Court Order to Stay Executions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2003, at A33 (quoting Gene Acuna, spokesman for Governor Rick Perry) (cited by Ku, supra note 3, at 512 n.280,
for similar proposition). This announcement came after the ICJ’s February 5, 2003, Avena Provisional Measures
Order but before the March 31, 2004 final orders in that case. Avena Final Order, supra note 17. A spokesman for
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steadfast prior to the ruling that it has no bearing on Texas . . . . We have contacted the State Department to get their
guidance. . . . But we still hold to our previous position.” Chris Kraul, U.S. Told to Review Death-penalty Cases
Mexico Hails U.N. Court Decision that 51 Inmates Were Denied Diplomatic Help, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at
A6, available at 2004 WLNR 1778240. Texas maintained its resolved in the face of President Bush’s decision to
order state courts to comply with the ICJ’s review order. Adam Liptak, supra note 26, at A16 (citing a statement by
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with the signing of the VCCR in 1969,198 the record would have undermined Bush’s
pronouncement, and the federal government could more comfortably dismiss the political
pressure against taking steps to enforce the ICJ rulings. On the other hand, if the states had
vigorously objected to the treaty, President Nixon would have had strong incentive not to sign it.
There would remain, of course, situations in which the federal government would want to
adopt a treaty over state opposition. The Australian reforms would not completely remedy the
unpopularity of such a move but might give it a degree of political legitimacy because, at the
very least, the states would have received procedural protection. The Australian reforms also
make allowances for keeping sensitive treaty talks confidential,199 and would, therefore, not
undermine the federal government’s ability to negotiate such treaties. Consequently, U.S.
adoption of the reforms would not significantly impede the federal government’s ability to
conduct foreign affairs and would provide it necessary political legitimacy to enforce its
international obligations. This combination would ease the current tension between state
concerns and international obligations and perhaps usher in an era of “cooperative federalism” in
the United States.
C. Effect of Australian Reforms on Potential Federalism Limits to the Treaty Power

198
Although the states have resisted the VCCR recently, it offers substantial benefits to their citizens abroad, which
might have induced them to support its ratification. Consider, for example, Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore’s
recognition of the importance or protecting citizens abroad in his statement explaining why he couldn’t stay the
execution of Angel Francisco Breard. Charney & Reisman, supra note 22, at 674 (quoting Gilmore as saying that the
Secretary of State’s concerns for citizens abroad “are due great respect and I have given them serious
consideration”).
199
First, even though the Australian federal government must keep the states abreast of treaty negotiations of
relevance to them, it can require that information concerning the negotiations be kept confidential. Principles and
Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 4.2(d). Furthermore, the reforms do not require the publication of NIAs until treaties
have been signed, id. ¶ 4.2(c) (explaining that NIAs are published when a treaty is tabled in Parliament, which
occurs after the treaty is signed, Reform of Treaty-Making, supra note 151), thus keeping the interest analysis private
until that point. Texts of bilateral treaties are also kept confidential until signed. Treaty Making Information Kit,
supra note 173, at Stages in the Development of Treaties. Finally, of course, in matters of extreme urgency, the
federal government can forego the tabling process, JSCOT Web site, supra note 153, and consultation, see supra
note 174 and accompanying text, altogether.
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Even if the federal government and state governments were to cooperate and adopt the
Australian reforms, there would still be the judicial branch to consider. The U.S. legal
environment is substantially different from that in Australia. While the Australian High Court
has consistently favored the federal government’s ability to make and implement treaties,200 the
Supreme Court has applied limits to the U.S. federal government’s power in a variety of areas,201
and the treaty power could be next. U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms, however, could give
the Court cause to hesitate in at least two instances.
Consider the Court’s potential application of the anticommandeering principle to treaty
implementation. In New York, the Court reasoned that the federal government should not be able
to commandeer state officials to carry out its directives because it confuses citizens as to which
political entity is responsible for them.202 If this sort of reasoning were applied in the treaty
context, it would prohibit the federal government from signing treaties where implementation is
left to the states because those treaties are federal acts that must be enforced by state officials.203
With the Australian reforms in place, however, citizens would have less cause for confusion as to
who is politically accountable for treaties because the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT
reports would indicate whether a treaty had been favored by a state government or had been
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See Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 42 (stating that the High Court’s “current position
is that . . . the mere acceptance of the treaty by Australia is sufficient basis for the Commonwealth to rely on the
terms of the treaty to enact implementing legislation”); supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting Congress’s authority to legislate under the
Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(holding that federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause cannot require local officials to execute federal
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505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1997).
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See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 432 (explaining how application of the anticommandeering
principle to the VCCR would, under Printz and New York, prevent the federal government from requiring either (1)
state officials to carry out notifications or (2) states to adopt implementing legislation).
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adopted despite state opposition.204 This transparency, therefore, could give the Supreme Court a
reason not to apply the anticommandeering principle to treaties.
Similarly, consider Bradley’s suggestion that the Court should overturn Holland.205 The
Court’s reasoning in Lopez and Morrison would support this move. Just as the Court feared with
the commerce power, an unlimited treaty power could lead to an unchecked federal police
power206 and federal interference in areas of traditional state concern.207 Adopting the Australian
reforms could not decisively prevent the federal government from ignoring state concerns and
using its treaty power abusively. If the reforms were adopted, however, the Court might feel less
compelled to provide the states legal protection because the reforms already provide significant
procedural and political protection when a treaty implicates traditional areas of state concern.208
The presence of these protections could also limit the consequences of the Court’s likely
adoption of the state sovereign immunity doctrine in the treaty context. While foreign nations
would still be prevented from suing states for treaty breaches, the federal government might feel
justified in suing to mend the breach because the offending state would already have had an
opportunity to consult on the treaty and would be aware of its requirements. Furthermore, as
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Treaty Making Information Kit, supra note 173, Introduction, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, The process
of parliamentary review (“An NIA includes information about . . . the consultation that has occurred with [s]tate and
[t]erritory Governments, industry and community groups and other interested parties.”); see Principles and
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See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would
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Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”); see also United States v. Morrison,
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Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (“‘Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of
traditional state concern . . . the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur . . . .’”
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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As indicated in the Principles and Procedures, the reforms are designed to “relate to treaties of sensitivity and
importance to the States and Territories.” Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 2.1.
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mentioned above, if the state had approved of the treaty during consultation, the federal
government would have a strong political justification for enforcing compliance.
D. Practicality of Applying Australian Reforms in the United States
Although adopting Australian-style procedural reforms would benefit both states and the
federal government and would potentially undermine Supreme Court reasons for applying
additional federalism limits, the reforms come with a degree of risk. First, they have only been in
place in Australia for a short time, and their long-term success in that country is uncertain.
Furthermore, it is impossible to know what measures the Supreme Court might introduce to limit
the treaty power in the future. If the Court decides, even in the face of the reforms, to prevent the
federal government from enforcing treaties that encroach on state traditional areas of concern,
the Australian reforms would do little to enable U.S. compliance with international law. In that
case, the reforms would only serve as an additional costly instrument favoring state interests.
Even if the Court does not choose to limit the treaty power, these types of procedural
reforms can be prohibitively costly. For example, although NEPA is frequently praised, the EISs
have been criticized as too expensive.209 This could be a major concern because the Australian
reforms not only require EIS-like NIAs210 but also the distribution of treaties under
consideration211 and the administration of the Treaties Council, JSCOT, and the State Standing
Committee.212 That Australia finds these reforms affordable213 alleviates this concern to some
extent in the United States, but it is hard to predict whether U.S. budget-makers will agree that
the benefits are worth the costs.
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Karkainnen, supra note 190, at 903 (generally criticizing the cost of EISs).
See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 145-50, 155-60 and accompanying text.
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Australia’s federal government splits some of the costs with the states, which bear the burden of funding state
representatives in treaty delegations. Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, ¶ 6.3.
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Financial considerations, however, are only one aspect of a more fundamental difficulty
surrounding the adoption of the Australian reforms in the United States: scale. Australia has only
six states and two territories; the U.S. has fifty states.214 This difference would increase costs and
bureaucracy. For example, in negotiating the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement,
“[t]he [Australian Federal] Government held meetings or teleconferences with representatives
from all the [s]tate and [t]erritory governments both before and after each of the six negotiating
rounds.”215 In the United States, similar consultations would not only be significantly more
expensive, but could potentially take much longer. Of course, the U.S. federal government could
easily control for undue delays by establishing a principle similar to the one built into the
Australian reforms that prevents treaties from being stymied by excessive state consultation.216
While the time problems of state consultation could be managed, the scale of the United
States would probably prohibit successful integration of a Treaties Council. In Australia, the
Prime Minister and the Premiers from each state can comfortably fit around a table. In the United
States, a meeting between the President and fifty Governors could not take the form of an
intimate consultation. In fact, John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary that it was the difficulties of
consulting with a similarly large group that caused President Washington to abandon the practice
of seeking Senate advice.217 After consulting in the Senate for two days on the 1789 Treaty with
the Creek Indians, Washington supposedly said that “he would be damned if he ever went there
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A stimulating conversation with Professor Gillian Triggs, University of Melbourne, alerted me to a variety of
concerns potentially caused by this difference.
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ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1.
216
The Australian “Principles and Procedures” were “adopted subject to their operation not being allowed to result
in unreasonable delays in the negotiating, joining or implementing of treaties by Australia.” Principles and
Procedures, supra note 16, Part A.
217
HAYDEN, supra note 56, at 23 n.4. (citing John Quincy Adams). Hayden explains that Washington did submit
later treaties to the Senate prior to negotiation but never again made the submission orally. Id.
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again.”218 It is hard to imagine the U.S. President agreeing to any such consultation with the state
Governors.
CONCLUSION
The practical problems of U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms wholesale are
significant. The United States could limit the severity of those problems, however, by only
adopting the most significant reforms: namely, the NIAs, JSCOT reports, and the State Standing
Committee. The Treaties Council has not played a major role in Australia219 and, because of the
difficulties of consultation between the President and Governors, is not really appropriate for the
United States. Jettisoning the Treaty Council would lessen some of the time and cost burdens of
the reforms and make them more palatable to the President.
The reforms would still be costly but no more so than other proposals attempting to
reconcile the tensions between international obligations and federalism. Consider the remedy of
allowing states to form international agreements.220 As was mentioned previously, such a system
would require radical and costly restructuring of U.S. methods of assigning state citizenship and
passports,221 while providing states less protection from the federal government’s treaty power
than the Australian reforms.222
The potential benefits of creating a State Standing Committee, establishing a JSCOT, and
implementing NIAs are considerable. Not only would the U.S. federal government have greater
political legitimacy to enforce state compliance with its international obligations, the states
would have the opportunity of consulting on any treaty touching state concern, something not
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possible even under Bradley’s vision of a court-limited treaty power. The reforms would also
contribute a degree of transparency to U.S. treaty making, a process that has been derided as
lacking democratic legitimacy.223
This is not to say that adoption of these reforms would definitively remedy the tensions
between state concerns and international obligations. The Supreme Court could still limit the
treaty power to make federal government enforcement of some international obligations
impossible. It is the reformation of the treaty process, however, that could give the Court the
incentive not to introduce those limits, which is what makes the adoption of reform so pressing.
There is no question that a move to introduce a State Standing Committee, a JSCOT, and
NIAs to the U.S. treaty process would face serious hurdles. The states would likely be pleased
with such reform, as at worst it would supplement potential legal protections. The President and
the Senate, however, would be certain to resist. Although Presidents and Senators have
frequently expounded on the virtues of states’ rights,224 it has been the trend for the political
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branches to attempt to expand their power, not give it up.225 Despite this rather significant hurdle,
however, adoption of treaty reform may be the only method for the executive and legislative
branches to protect their treaty power from limitation by the Supreme Court.
Although state advice in the U.S. treaty process through a State Standing Committee and
NIAs would not precisely resemble the Framers’ vision of Senate consultation during treaty
making, it would successfully integrate states into the treaty-making process for the first time
since 1913. Furthermore, it would allow the federal government to continue to support
federalism without sacrificing treaty obligations. For these reasons, lawmakers should consider
the Australian reforms of the State Standing Committee, JSCOT reports, and NIAs as they
determine how best to reconcile competing state and federal interests in the treaty process.
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Consider, for example, Professor Michael J. Gerhardt’s historical contextualization of President George W.
Bush’s expansion of executive branch power under the USA Patriot Act and in the environmental realm: “With
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States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 108-09 (1997), even at
a time when the crime rate was declining. Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of
Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 806-07 (1996).

45

